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Abstract Household skills provide job skills when tasks in jobs and household
production are similar and jobs produce substitutes for home-made services.
Opportunity costs of higher education are foregone earnings during schooling and
foregone household production while studying and later in life. I show that
individuals in jobs requiring household skills accept lower wage rates than
traditional human capital theory predicts, and that individuals with low household
skills tend to enter higher education. According to these results, declining household
skills may have contributed to the observed increasing demand for higher education
by women.
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1 Introduction
When a mother teaches her daughter to make a bed or clean a bathroom, it is probably to
get a ‘helping hand’ while the daughter lives at home and to train a potential wife, as
household skills make a girl independent of buying household services in the future.
However, an unintentional effect of teaching household skills may be to influence
occupational and educational choice by encouraging the daughter to turn into a
chambermaid in the hotel industry. This paper presents the idea that household skills
decrease demand for higher education by qualifying for some service occupations.
Individuals with more household skills have less incentive to choose occupations that
require higher education, because the future earnings of higher educated employees must
not only compensate for tuition costs and foregone earnings during education but also
absorb the indirect costs of lower household production while studying and later in life.
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In economic literature, the home is the site of consumption and leisure. In her
classic work, Reid (1934, pp. 6–7) distinguishes consumption and leisure activities
that you prefer to do yourself (i.e. reading the newspaper) as opposed to household
production that you would like somebody else to do for you (i.e. cleaning).
Household skills are learnt at home in a learning-by-doing process and increase
productivity both in household production and in occupations with tasks similar to
household production. Of course, the types of household skills that are acquired at
home vary according to time and space. Modern, industrialised economies are
addressed here and such types of household production as caring for babies and
dependants, cleaning, cooking, driving, gardening, laundry, car maintenance, house
maintenance, shopping, production and repair of clothes and seeking household
information. A person with much household skill has a high productivity at home in
unpaid work and can earn a living from a job in firms like bakeries, restaurants,
laundries, gardeners and day-care centers. Organised training may add to certain
household skills; according to Becker (1991, p. 27): ‘Some investments, such as on-
the-job training, mainly raises the productivity of market time; others, such as
classes in child care, cooking, or art history, mainly raise the productivity of
household time.’ However, classes in cooking increase productivity in jobs, such as
kitchen help as well, whereas classes in child care increase productivity in jobs as a
child care assistant.
In this paper, I present a model of how household skills can influence college
enrolment. Household skills supplement the explanations suggested in the literature:
college costs, borrowing constraints, business cycle, parental education, family
income and wealth and scholastic preparedness (math and language skills). I return
to the latter in Sections 3 and 4. According to my model, declining household skills
may have contributed to the observed increasing demand for higher education. As
mothers entered the labour market, learning-by-doing options for household skills
were reduced, especially for girls, thereby increasing female demand for higher
education.
My model is a partial equilibrium model in which persons with varying
household skills choose between becoming a chambermaid earning a piece-rate
wage v or becoming an economist by graduating from higher education and earning
an hourly wage rate w. The wage rates v and w are exogenously given. I show how
persons with more household skills than a critical value a* will opt for the
chambermaid job, while those with lower household skills than a* will become an
economist. I have elsewhere shown how this partial equilibrium can be embedded in
a general equilibrium model.1
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following way: Section 2 presents
the partial equilibrium model that shows that youth with more household skills are
less inclined to choose higher education because of higher opportunity cost of
1 I do this in Dale (2002, pp. 42–46) where I show that (a) the relative supply of the inputs (cleaned rooms
per day relative to economist hours) is an increasing function of v/w, with the elasticity of supply
depending on the distribution of household skills in the population (this is inspired by Roy 1951), and (b)
the relative demand for inputs is a decreasing function of v/w if the total output is a neoclassical
production function. Thus, the relative wage rate v/w and the critical value a* are determined
endogenously in the labour market.
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education. They are willing to accept lower wage rates in household skilled jobs than
predicted by traditional human capital theory. Section 3 discusses limitations of the
model, measurement problems of household production and skills and presents
results from relevant studies. Section 4 addresses educational policy issues, and the
concluding Section 5 suggests that the main idea that household skills represent an
opportunity cost of schooling may be highly relevant in developing countries.
2 A model of educational choice based on earnings and household production
What characterizes investment in human capital? According to Mincer (1958),
education is acquisition of human capital that raises productivity and earnings.
Human capital theory recognises foregone earnings as part of the human capital
investment. Because it is difficult to distinguish expenses for consumption and
investment, Schultz (1961) estimates investment in human capital by its yield, not
like real capital by its investment expenses. Bowman (1966, p. 114) criticises human
capital theory for limiting returns to earnings by excluding income in kind from
household production that reduces consumption expenses. My model addresses
Bowman’s criticism.
Gronau (1977) pioneers a model of the allocation of time where unpaid work is a
separate use of time and household productivity varies among individuals, an
approach which I use here. I model how the amount of household skills acquired
during youth may influence an individual’s decisions concerning future occupation
and education, ceteris paribus. Paid and unpaid work largely offset each other
according to Gronau (1986), Jenkins and O’Leary (1997) and Burda et al. (2006).
Therefore, I assume total working hours for paid and unpaid work to be fixed, and,
hence, fixed leisure hours, too.
For given market prices of commodities, maximised utility can be expressed in
terms of money through a money-metric utility function (see Weymark 1985 for
sufficient conditions). As for the relationship between home-made and market
commodities, the qualitative results of my analysis require only that purchased
market commodities (a maid or housecleaning services) can compensate for
household production (unpaid cleaning of own dwelling) at some finite level of
expenditure, i.e. household production is measured by the expenditure that could
compensate for it. I will refer to maximised money-metric utility as ‘consumption’.
However, in the graphic explanations and the analytical derivations below, I will
assume, following Gronau (1977), that there exists a household production function,
which output in terms of consumption is a stable function of the number of hours in
unpaid household production, independent of the total consumption possibilities
available to the individual through spending income from paid work to purchase
market commodities. The existence of a single composite consumption good, which
can be both produced at home and purchased, is a sufficient condition for such a
stable household production function. This is a common assumption in the literature
following Gronau (1977); see, e.g. Burda et al. (2006). As a simplified
representation of the real world, an individual can choose between two occupations,
one for which household skills matters and another for which they do not. For the
purpose of illustration, these are referred to as ‘chambermaid’ and ‘economists’. An
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individual decides upon higher education and occupation at the age of 18. Either she
obtains a chambermaid job using her household skills as job skills or she enrols in a
5-year programme in higher education and graduates on time as an economist.
Assume that the chambermaid will work from age 18 to 60 and the economist from
age 23 to 60. To evaluate the situation in a lifetime perspective, I assume access to
perfect capital markets, so the alternatives can be compared by discounting. Even
though the tax system is crucial for the trade-off in households between ‘make’ or
‘buy’ (in particular, the relevant wage rate is the wage net of income tax and the
relevant product price includes value added tax), taxes are not modelled; for a
justification of this modelling choice, see Section 3.
To move from a dynamic to a static model (i.e. from a lifetime to a workday) and
thereby facilitate illustrations, I make the additional assumptions:
& For schooling, costs for tuition, fees and books are zero.
& Students live in dormitories and do no household tasks and have no jobs while
studying.
& In real terms, the wage rates are constant over time for each profession. Job
productivity does not increase from learning-by-doing or on-the-job training.
& Household productivity does not increase from learning-by-doing as an adult.
& The number of workdays per year, k, is constant.
& The interest rate, r, is constant.
2.1 The chambermaid case
First, assume that the person becomes a chambermaid to capitalise on her household
skills. Then, she allocates her time between paid work in a hotel and unpaid
household production to maximise lifetime consumption. Assume that household
production, ai f (H), consists of two elements, an individual productivity coefficient
(ai) and a general household production function, f (H), identical for everybody. The
household production f (H) increases in hours (H), but at a decreasing rate because
anyone starts with the tasks where the productivity is the highest. However,
individuals vary in household skills and household productivity (ai). Further assume
that the chambermaid sells room-cleaning services in a competitive labour market at
the piece rate v. Then, the hourly wage rate as a chambermaid is determined
according to her actual household productivity in a piece-rate system. Generally,
correct assessment of household skills is unrealistic, but this assumption keeps the
analysis on the human capital track by abstracting from screening aspects. For
simplicity, the modelling assumes an interior solution where both hours in household
production and hours in wage work are positive. In this one-person model, the
chambermaid seeks to maximise lifetime consumption. According to the above
assumptions, this implies maximising total output from household production and
wage work per workday:
maxH ai f Hð Þ þ 12 Hð Þaiv½ ;
where ai is the household productivity of person i, in accordance with her household
skills; H is the number of hours in unpaid household production; f (H) is the
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household production function, f(0)=0, f ′>0, f ″<0 and f ′→ ∞ when H→ 0; (12−H)
is the number of hours spent in paid work; and v is the piece rate per cleaned room in
the labour market for chambermaids.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, consumption and total output are maximised by
combining positive amounts of unpaid and paid work, because the decreasing
marginal household productivity makes the first unpaid tasks more productive than
the later ones. For example, because of her high productivity in cleaning, the
chambermaid mostly cleans her home herself, and because of a lower productivity in
sewing, she works in the hotel and buys her clothing. To maximise total output
available for consumption, the chambermaid works unpaid at home for Hm hours to
generate household production, ai f (Hm). At the point at which the market value of
additional household production equals her wage rate as a chambermaid, she
switches to the labour market and works (12−Hm) hours. For these hours, the real
wage rate, aiv, is higher than the marginal productivity in additional household
production.
Figure 1 shows that the optimal number of hours in unpaid and paid work for
chambermaids depends only on the piece rate per cleaned room. A higher piece rate
will increase hours in wage work and reduce hours in household production.
Because the chambermaid’s household skills determine both her household and job
productivities, optimal hours in household production (Hm) are independent of her
household productivity (ai) when the employer pays a piece rate per cleaned room.
However, the chambermaid’s total output (at home and in the work place) depends
crucially on her household productivity, ai. These results are formally established in
the Appendix.
2.2 The economist case
The above discussion and definitions allow us to treat the economist case more
compactly. The economist has some household skills and 5 years of higher education
 Consumption Cm 
aif(Hm)+(12-Hm)aiv     
                                               ai v 
                  ai f(Hm) 
                                                                       Hm                                        12  Working hours 
Fig. 1 The chambermaid (m): optimal allocation of time to unpaid and paid work
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in economics and wants to maximise consumption and total output from household
production and earnings per workday:
maxH ai f Hð Þ þ 12 Hð Þw½ 
where w is the hourly wage rate of economists. Given the assumptions, the optimal
allocation of hours to household production and wage work depends on the wage
rate of economists and on the individual household productivity (ai). In particular,
the economist switches from unpaid to paid work where the slope of the common
household production function multiplied by the person’s household productivity
equals the wage rate. Moreover, the optimal number of hours spent in unpaid work
increases with higher household productivity and decreases with higher wage rate of
economists, and vice versa for the optimal number of hours spent in wage work.
These results are shown in the Appendix.
2.3 The indifferent individual and the novel wage gap
Why focus attention on the indifferent individual with household productivity a*?
Because she determines the equilibrium wage gap between the two occupations, and
demonstrates why household skilled jobs may accept lower wages than predicted by
traditional human capital theory. To be indifferent between becoming a chambermaid
and an economist, the following must hold:
maxH a*f Hð Þ þ 12 Hð Þa*v½ kAm ¼ maxH a*f Hð Þ þ 12 Hð Þw½ kAe;
where Am denotes the present value at the age of 18 of $1 every year (from age 18 to
60) for a chambermaid, and Ae denotes the present value at the age of 18 of $1 every
year (from age 23 to 60) for an economist (see the Appendix for formal definitions).
Because of the simplifying assumptions, we can transfer the analysis from a
lifetime perspective to a representative period model by using the factor δ where δ=
Ae/Am. The ratio δ captures several factors: the difference in productive years
between the two occupations, the delay of household production and earnings
because of higher education, and the discount rate, r. Because the economist has
fewer productive years, which start later, and the discount rate is positive, δ is less
than 1. Consequently, the economist must have higher total yearly output during
productive years for a person to be indifferent between becoming an economist and a
chambermaid. Hence, the output of a workday for the economist is multiplied by δ
(adjusted) to compare to the output of a workday for the chambermaid.
maxH a*f Hð Þ þ 12 Hð Þa*v½  ¼ maxH a*f Hð Þ þ 12 Hð Þw½ δ ð1Þ
Figure 2 compares the optimal workday of the indifferent person as a
chambermaid or an economist. Here, daily consumption (0D) is equal corresponding
to the output for the chambermaid and adjusted workday output for the economist.
Figure 2 shows that a chambermaid occupation makes the indifferent person produce
more at home when accounting for household production, thus addressing
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Bowman’s (1966) criticism. To see this, consider the ratio of discounted value of
household production in the two occupations:
0C
0A
¼ 0Aþ ABþ BC
0A
> 1 ð2Þ
0C represents the optimal household production by the chambermaid. 0A
represents the optimal adjusted household production by the economist. AB is the
chambermaid’s additional household production because of longer daily hours in
unpaid household production. BC represents her additional years in household
production while the economist is studying. Hence, for an indifferent individual, the
discounted lifetime value of household production is higher if she becomes a
chambermaid.
Figure 2 also illustrates how the indifferent person is compensated by higher
lifetime earnings in the labour market as an economist, i.e. AD/CD>1. The person is
indifferent towards the chambermaid’s lower lifetime earnings and the economist’s
higher lifetime earnings because of an opposite compensating difference in lifetime
household production. This result contradicts the human capital earnings function
approach where an individual is assumed to be indifferent towards jobs with equal
lifetime labour market earnings; see Freeman (1986).
The difference in lifetime earnings is made up of two components. First, the
economist would have had higher lifetime earnings even if the daily working hours
in paid work of the two occupations had been equal:
a*v < δw ð3Þ
as illustrated by the slopes of their paid work compensation lines in Fig. 2. Second,
the economist chooses to work longer daily hours in paid work, i.e. 12−He>12−Hm.
Results 2 and 3 are formally established in the Appendix.
 Consumption  
                                               a*v 
                                                           a* f(12) 
                                        δ w                                 δ a*f(12) 






Fig. 2 Indifference between two occupations: chambermaid and economist
Household skills and low wages
2.4 How household skills influence enrolment in higher education
In line with Roy’s (1951) seminal analysis, I assume that skill heterogeneity w.r.t. ai
determines the distribution of individuals across occupations, keeping all else equal.
In my model household productivity of the indifferent individual, a*, becomes a
divider between occupations. Figure 3 illustrates what happens to earnings,
consumption and educational choice as household productivity increases. Here, the
piece rate for clean rooms, v, is normalised to 1, and everything is related to the
hourly wage rate. Lifetime consumption consists of commodities bought by her
earnings and produced at home.
In Fig. 3, dashed lines refer to economists and solid lines to chambermaids. The
lifetime earnings of an economist are determined by the hourly wage rate for
economists (an exogenous w) and her household productivity (ai). For an economist,
a very low individual household productivity means very little unpaid household
production. As household productivity increases, the economist spends fewer hours
in the labour market, and lifetime earnings are reduced (the declining dashed line),
whereas the additional household production more than compensates lifetime
consumption (the increasing dashed line in Fig. 3).
The lifetime earnings of the chambermaid are determined by the piece rate for
clean rooms and her household productivity. As her household productivity
increases, lifetime earnings of the chambermaid increase proportionally (given her
constant hours of wage work), illustrated by the increasing lower solid line in Fig. 3.
Furthermore, the chambermaid’s household production increases proportionally as
her household productivity increases (given her constant hours spent in household
production); see the increasing upper solid line in Fig. 3. If the chambermaid is
forced to devote all hours to the hotel industry, she would have consumed less (along
the 45° line).
Fig. 3 How household skills and productivities impact enrolment in higher education
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Figure 3 shows that the lifetime discounted consumption of the indifferent
individual with household productivity a* is equal for both occupations (B).
However, most economists were not indifferent towards becoming a chambermaid
and vice versa. If the person has a lower level of household skills and productivity,
like a1, she will choose the economics education to obtain A, her maximum lifetime
consumption. In this model, people enter higher education because of a gap in
household skills offering fewer opportunities in the labour market at 18 years of age.
However, if the person has a higher level of household skills and household
productivity, like a3, she will choose to become a chambermaid to obtain C. Note
that a person with higher household productivity (a3) may earn a much lower hourly
wage rate than a person with lower household skills (a1), because a3v<δw<w in Fig. 3.
However, for a sufficiently high household productivity (ai), this does not hold.
3 Model results vs empirical evidence
Figure 3 shows that economists are worse off than chambermaids if all assumptions of
this model are fulfilled and people opt for occupations accordingly. Should we feel
pity for those who acquire higher education? The model of this paper does not contain
scholastic ability (math and language skills), which is the actual entry criterion for
higher education. In reality, the persons with low household skills, which in my model
enrol in economics, actually fall into two groups: those with sufficient scholastic
ability to become economists and those with insufficient scholastic ability. Those in
the latter group are forced to end up as chambermaids with low productivity (at home
and in the labour market). The model results, therefore, show a too rosy picture of
actual chambermaids’ earnings and household production. Hence, answering questions
about actual enrolment into higher education and distributional questions between
groups with varying education would require a more comprehensive model. The
objective is to pinpoint one unnoticed occupational wage differential, which is driven
by the evaluation of the indifferent person and compensated by household production
in her case. This also justifies the choice not to introduce taxes for redistributive
purposes in the model.2 However, there is support for my claim that factors other than
scholastic ability are also important determinants for the actual choice of higher
education. Cigno (2001) and Rosen and Willis (1979) argue that persons choose
education and occupation according to comparative advantage. Men entering college
score lower in tests of mechanical ability and higher in math and reading
comprehension than other male high school graduates according to Rosen and Willis
(1979). Mechanical ability in their study and household skills in my model both
capture learning-by-doing skills during youth.
What aspects are measured about household production? Time inputs and
purchased inputs are measured. There is presently no measure of the amount of
various home-made goods and services produced nor of individual household skills
or productivities. Measurement problems of household production and household
2 See Balestrino et al. (2003) for an interesting analysis of optimal second-best redistributive taxation of
households, which differ in both market and non-market abilities. Note that the optimal solution may
imply a combination of income and indirect taxes.
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skills hamper testing of my model’s results. Generally, estimations of earnings
functions may address the lack of household productivity measures by using panel
data and differencing away individual fixed effects to control for household skills
that vary among individuals in ways unknown to researchers. Besides, instrumental
variables may be used when appropriate.
Parents, siblings and the home environment influence a child in various ways. For
instance, important psychological factors like self-confidence and conscientiousness
are influenced by parenting styles. Different types of skills may interplay in complex
ways, so that skills may be substitutes in some areas and complements in others.
Dunifon et al. (2001) uses a unique data set and contributes to identify a home-
related measure of family ‘organisation and efficiency’ (using total family
housework hours and interviewers’ assessments of the cleanliness of the respondents
dwelling). They find that organisation and efficiency is predictive of children’s
education and parents’ and children’s earnings 25 years later. This result of Dunifon
et al. (2001) that higher family organisation and efficiency increases years of
schooling appears to contradict the result of the present paper. Can these results be
reconciled? Family organisation and efficiency captures several factors like (a) the
child’s own cleaning experience, (b) learning good manners, i.e. to wipe one’s feet
and not spread one’s belongings around and (c) parents’ chores that create a nicer
home for homework, encouraging more completed schooling. Consequently, family
organisation and efficiency is wider than the individual household productivity at
age 18 in my model, which corresponds only to factor (a). Hence, the results are not
necessarily contradictory.
Because my model hinges on household skill heterogeneity among youth,
Solberg’s (1994) time-budget study for 11–12-year-old Norwegian children in the
mid-1980s is relevant. On average, these girls do more household production than
boys, and girls dominate housework and caring for children, while boys dominate
repair and outdoor tasks. Whether the family runs a farm or another business
influences what tasks children do. Solberg (1994) supports the main idea in my
model that youth have had different learning-by-doing at home before making their
educational and occupational choices.
The new indifference condition for occupational choice accounts for differences
in wage earnings and differences in household production. It resonates with several
studies (Aslaksen and Koren 1996; Jenkins and O’Leary 1997) reporting a smaller
dispersion of extended income (including earnings and household production) than
of earnings. In addition, other studies (Arai et al. 1998; Kniesner 1981; Bernhardt et
al. 2003) report low-wage occupations in cleaning, hotel and restaurants, catering,
private service, private household, day-care, retail, etc., i.e. jobs where tasks are
similar to household production. To what extent household production might
compensate low earnings was not addressed in them.
4 Issues of educational policy for future research
While the model of this paper does not discuss how the distribution of household
skills comes about, with this model and Dunifon et al. (2001) as a backdrop, one
may still ask about effects of various upbringings. In particular, should parents
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promote household skills? An affirmative answer is not warranted. If youth
household chores reduce their homework hours, there is a negative correlation
between youth’s higher household skills and their scholastic preparedness. This
negative correlation may deny a girl being brought up in a traditional way entry into
higher education, so that she ends up as a brighter than usual chambermaid. Such
wasting of academic talent may be important in families with low income and wealth
when parents demand youth to do chores because they cannot afford to buy similar
services. Presumably, this was more of a problem to previous generations, like
today’s grandparents.
Why has girls’ enrolment into higher education risen recently? In addition to
improved labour marked opportunities, reduced learning of household skills may
play a role. In modern economies, more goods and services are bought in the market
place and fewer produced at home as mothers have entered the labour market. The
reduction in household production has reduced children’s learning-by-doing of
household skills, particularly for girls, and according to this model, more girls have
less household skills and, therefore, choose higher education.
In addition, novel activities enter homes, and household skills increase in scope.
Home-based PCs contribute towards information-gathering and recreational activi-
ties, and children operating PCs acquire computer skills. If computer learning-
by-doing at home predominantly affects boys, we can expect male youth to possess
most computer household skills. Two conditions are relevant to this model. First,
household production in computing must substitute for market services. For
instance, people with computer science skills may install various software and
internet access themselves, use internet banking, buy tickets or do more advanced
tasks like assemble a computer. Secondly, if computer science jobs get piece-rate
pay, the model predicts that youth with high computer science productivity may
choose such a job at the expense of higher education. ‘Household skilled’ male-
dominated jobs will appear in computer science according to the model in this paper.
If one is concerned that youth in industrialised countries will turn into adults with
too low household skills to support a healthy lifestyle, then such a gap in household
skills might be bridged by adding home economics topics to the curriculum of
compulsory education. Could it be beneficial to supply modernised programmes in
home economics that meet requirements of vocational programmes in child care,
cleaning, kitchen or nursing assistance? Because of increasing household skills from
such programmes, the graduates could expect higher wages and earnings in
household skilled jobs and higher productivity at home.
5 Concluding remarks
When young people have finished compulsory education, they have to choose
whether to look for a job or for further education. Human capital theory argues that
wage differences among occupations and the ability to learn during education are
important factors influencing occupational and educational choices. This paper
argues that, in addition, the amount of household skills that young people possess
may influence these choices. The focus is on modern economies and such kinds of
household production as child care, cleaning, cooking, driving, gardening, laundry,
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car maintenance, house maintenance, production and repair of clothes, shopping and
PC work. Learning-by-doing in household production enhances household skills.
The model in this paper indicates that occupations that use household skills, such as
a chambermaid, may pay lower wage rates than traditional human capital theory
predicts. This stems from the result that future earnings of higher educated
employees not only have to compensate for educational costs and foregone wage
earnings during education but, in addition, for lower household production while
studying and later in life. The model predicts that youth who acquire much
household skills may often enter occupations where household skills raise
productivity in occupational tasks. However, youth with little household skills are
predicted to choose occupations that require higher education, all else equal.
Presumably, household skills are more important in developing countries where
education is non-universal and shorter. However, a different technology of
household production makes extensions complex. Returning to the introductory
example, if the daughter has not been taught to make a bed and clean a bathroom,
but to fetch water and firewood, she needs additional training to become a
chambermaid in the hotel industry. However, the main idea – that household skills
will reduce incentives for enrolment in education – is highly relevant for
understanding the pattern of enrolment into, as well as completion of, primary and
secondary education in developing countries. Thereby, household skills may be fruitful
in research about child labour and low-educational enrolment in developing countries.
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Consider the problem of the chambermaid maximising lifetime consumption, Cm:
maxHCm ¼ maxH f Hð Þ þ 12 Hð Þv½ aikAm:
From the first-order condition, optimal number of hours in household production
Hm satisfies
f 0 Hmð Þ ¼ v or Hm ¼ H nð Þ; ð4Þ
where H is the inverse function of f ′, implying that H′<0. Hence, the chambermaid’s
optimal hours in household production and in wage work depend only on the piece
rate per cleaned room and is notably independent of individual household productivity.
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Consider next the economist maximising lifetime consumption, Ce:
maxHCe ¼ maxH ai f Hð Þ þ 12 Hð Þw½ kAe:
From the first-order condition, optimal number of hours in household production
He satisfies
f 0 Heð Þ ¼ wai or He ¼ H w=aið Þ: ð5Þ
Because f is a strictly concave function, Eq. 5 shows that the optimal number of
hours spent in unpaid work increases with higher household productivity and
decreases with higher wage rate of economists, and vice versa for the optimal
number of hours spent in wage work.
Results 2 and 3 of the main text are formally established as follows: By
combining Eq. 1 with Eqs. 4 and 5, it follows that the indifferent individual must
satisfy ai=a*, where a* is determined by
a*f Hmð Þ þ 12 Hmð Þa*f 0 Hmð Þ ¼ a*f Heð Þ þ 12 Heð Þa*f 0 Heð Þ½ δ:
Now divide by a* to obtain
f Hmð Þ þ 12 Hmð Þf 0 Hmð Þ ¼ f Heð Þ þ 12 Heð Þf 0 Heð Þ½ δ; ð6Þ
and take into account that 0<δ<1, implying that
f Hmð Þ þ 12 Hmð Þf 0 Hmð Þ < f Heð Þ þ 12 Heð Þf 0 Heð Þ:
From the property that
d
dH
f Hð Þ þ 12 Hð Þf 0 Hð Þ½  ¼ f 0 Hð Þ  f 0 Hð Þ þ 12 Hð Þf 00 Hð Þ ¼ 12 Hð Þf 00 Hð Þ < 0;
it now follows that 0<He<Hm<12. Hence, the indifferent individual works longer
hours at home if she takes on a chambermaid job and shorter hours in the labour
market. Because 0<δ<1 and f is increasing, this implies that f Hmð Þ > df Heð Þ,
which is a restatement of result 2.
The new result about wage rates, i.e. result 3 of the main text, can be restated as
a*f 0 Hmð Þ ¼ a*v < δw ¼ δa*f 0 Heð Þ: ð7Þ
To show Eq. 7, first use Eq. 6 to obtain:
12 δf 0 Heð Þ  f 0 Hmð Þ½  ¼ f Hmð Þ  Hm f 0 Hmð Þ½   δ f Heð Þ  He f 0 Heð Þ½ : ð8Þ
Because Hm>He, and δ<1, and also
d
dH
f Hð Þ  Hf 0 Hð Þ½  ¼ Hf 00 Hð Þ > 0
it follows that the right-hand-side of Eq. 8 is positive. Hence, the left-hand-side of
Eq. 8 is also positive, consequently, δ f ′(He)> f ′(Hm), thereby establishing Eq. 7 and
result 3.
Household skills and low wages
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